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Summary: In 1924 and 1925 the Comintern introduced its policy of Bolshevization.
A goal of Bolshevization was the creation of mass-based communist parties. In
settler societies this meant that the local communist party should aim to be
demographically representative of the entire population. This article traces the
efforts of the communist parties in Algeria and South Africa to indigenize, seeking
to explain why their efforts had such diverse outcomes. It examines four variables:
the patterns of working-class formation; the socialist tradition of each country; the
relationship between the Comintern and the two communist parties; and the level of
repression against communists in both societies. The cumulative weight of the
variables in the Algerian case helps to explain why communist activity in the 1920s
– including the communist party’s ability to indigenize – was far more difficult in
Algeria than South Africa.
The establishment of the Communist International (Comintern), follow-
ing the 1917 Russian Revolution, inaugurated a period in which
communism was promoted as a path of development that could be
exported and implemented through a general, scientific model. This model,
according to the Comintern, could be applied to all societies and was
believed to be the one means of making an effective revolution. Yet, this
general model was applied in a variety of social conditions and refracted
through diverse perspectives. Although the apparent success of the Soviet
revolution inevitably meant its dominance as a blueprint for socialist
revolution, local communists interpreted Comintern and, more broadly,
Marxist ideas in terms of their own traditions and experiences.1 This article
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addresses the question of why a general policy – that of Bolshevization
propagated by the Comintern in 1924 and 1925 and, specifically, the goal
of indigenization – had strikingly diverse consequences in two African
settler societies, Algeria and South Africa.2
The policy of Bolshevization, unveiled at the Fifth Comintern Congress
in June–July 1924 and revised by the Comintern’s Executive Committee
(ECCI) in March–April 1925, concerned the organization of communist
parties – or national sections – and their relationship to the Comintern.
Following the Russian model, national sections were to be centralized and
subjected to proletarian discipline; factions were no longer permitted. In
addition to this reorganization, Bolshevization included other aims.3 One
of these was the creation of mass-based communist parties. In settler
societies this necessarily meant that the local communist party should aim
to be demographically representative of the entire population. While the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was successful in this goal of
indigenization, becoming an overwhelmingly black organization by the
end of the 1920s, in Algeria, the Communist Party remained predomi-
nantly European in composition in the 1920s and 1930s. A standard
explanation for the failure of indigenization in the Algerian case refers to
the paternalistic and even racist attitudes of the numerically dominant
European members. Yet, by comparison with the CPSA, it is difficult to
sustain this argument. A comparative analysis shows that the difficulties in
indigenizing faced by the Communist Party in Algeria were more complex
than this claim suggests.
This article examines four variables across the Algerian and South
African cases, any one of which might be a plausible explanatory factor.
First, there is the political economy of each society, and specifically the
patterns of working-class formation. Second, there is the socialist tradition
of each country, out of which the respective communist movements
developed. Third, there is the relationship between the Comintern and the
national sections in question – the geopolitics of the international
communist network. Finally, there is the political system, and particularly,
the level of repression against communists in both societies during the
period in which Bolshevization was launched. This comparative and
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multivariable approach has implications for the study of the Comintern
and its sections. Most discussions of the international communist network
have been framed in terms of a centre–periphery model; debates have
concerned the extent to which the Moscow-based Comintern dominated
its sections. Consideration of a variety of possible causal factors, each of
which could vary across a range of cases, indicates that such a problematic
is far too simple to illuminate the complexities of communism as an
international system.
A L G E R I A A N D S O U T H A F R I C A : P O L I T I C A L C O N T R O L
A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M Y
Algeria and South Africa display a number of striking similarities. Both
countries were subjected to a protracted process of military conquest that
resulted in the suppression of the indigenous people, the undermining of
their social systems and the denigration of their cultures. Both countries
were settler societies characterized by a striking national or ethnic divide –
socially, economically and politically – between the European settlers and
the indigenous majorities. In both countries, the precolonial peasantry was
subjected to a long process of proletarianization. As arable land was
appropriated by Europeans, the land available to the indigenous people for
cultivation and for grazing declined dramatically, leading first to share-
cropping and then to the development of an agricultural proletariat and a
migrant labour force. Rural Algerians moved first to cities in the late
nineteenth century and then to France, while in South Africa, rural
Africans became migrant workers on the mines and in towns. This process
led, in both cases, to the formation of an urban working class that was
rigidly divided along national or ethnic lines.4 Muslim Algerians and black
South Africans were subjected to extreme social, economic, and political
inequalities vis-a`-vis their European and white counterparts.5
Nonetheless, the political systems and patterns of proletarianization of
Algeria and South Africa differed in significant respects. In 1834, the
French wrested control of Algeria from the Ottoman Empire, which had
dominated it from the sixteenth century, and legally constituted it as part
4. See, inter alia, Robert Ross, A Concise History of South Africa (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 21–
53ff.; Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present (London,
1991), pp. 5–27, 65–67; John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation
(Bloomington, IN [etc.], 1992).
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of France. The French government’s policy aimed to unite European
settlers, whatever their national origins, under the rubric of French
citizenship. From 1865, North African Jews had the right to apply for
French naturalization on an individual basis; the Cre´mieux decree of
October 1870 gave French citizenship and equal rights to all North
African Jews in Algeria.6 Muslims, by contrast, were subjected to a set of
regulations known as the code de l’indige´nat [Native Code], while
government policy also divided the Arab and Berber Muslim populations
through differential education and socialization. The code de l’indige´nat
remained in place until the Second World War. It aimed, according to
Charles-Robert Ageron, to compel Algerians to strict obedience to the
French regime.7 The code imposed extremely harsh punishments on
Algerians for infractions that were not illegal in France but were unlawful
in Algeria when committed by Algerians. These infractions included
travelling without a permit, failure to pay special ‘‘native’’ taxes, defaming
the French Republic, and speaking disrespectfully to or about a French
official. The code de l’indige´nat also meant that Algerians were not able to
join the Communist Party.8
Efforts to reform the Algerian political system to allow greater Muslim
representation date from the early twentieth century but were repeatedly
met by resistance from European settlers. The reform movement gained
momentum in 1907–1908 through the efforts of the Jeunes Alge´riens.
Styling themselves in opposition to the Vieux Turbans, the Jeunes
Alge´riens idealized French culture and, in the years before the First
World War, aspired to assimilation with France. The reform movement
died down during the War, and postwar efforts at political reform,
including the idea of common representation for both Europeans and
Algerians, continued to meet with settler resistance. The Jonnart Law of 4
February 1919, which gave 43 per cent of the adult male Algerian
population the right to vote in separate electoral colleges for those
classified as non-French, conceded to settler concerns by dropping the idea
of common representation for Europeans and Algerians. The maximum
proportion of representation for Algerians was one-fourth in general
councils and one-third in municipal councils.9 But the Jonnart reforms
were strongly criticized by the Jeunes Alge´riens. This group gained a
charismatic leader in the person of Emir Khaled – grandson of the
6. Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History, pp. 1–12; Charles-Andre´ Julien, Histoire de l’Alge´rie
Contemporaine, vol. 1, 3rd edn (Paris, 1986), pp. 2–105, 464–467.
7. Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Alge´rie Contemporaine, vol. 2 (Paris, 1979), p. 24.
8. Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins, p. 88; Janet Dorsch Zagoria, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of the
Movement of Messali Hadj in Algeria, 1924–1954’’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Columbia
University, NY, 1973), p. 45.
9. Ageron, Histoire de l’Alge´rie Contemporaine, pp. 227–253; Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The
Origins, pp. 110–112, 91–92.
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anticolonialist Emir Abdel-Kader, who by the age of eighteen had
declared, ‘‘Je suis Arabe and je veux rester Arabe’’. In 1919, Khaled
launched the influential bilingual newspaper L’Ikdam [Courage], in which
the Jeunes Alge´riens attacked the reforms and the beni-oui-oui, or ‘‘yes-
men’’, who supported the French politicians.10
In contrast to the very close relationship of Algeria and France, South
Africa became effectively a politically autonomous union in 1910. But
this followed several centuries of European settlement and military
conquest. The first European settlement in this part of Africa was
established at the Cape in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company,
leading to the destruction of the indigenous Khoisan pastoralist society.
The British took control of the Cape Colony in 1806, leading, by the
1830s, to an exodus of Dutch settlers, or Afrikaners, north and east. The
Afrikaners fought a series of wars over several decades against the
indigenous African societies in the interior of the country and established
political control. In 1843, Britain annexed Port Natal, wrested control of
the region from Afrikaners and fought a series of military battles with the
Zulus over many decades.
Rivalry between the British and Afrikaners was spurred by the mineral
discoveries of the late nineteenth century, as was imperialist-fuelled
industrialization. Diamonds were discovered in 1867; by 1870 there were
an estimated 10,000 diamond diggers. Africans had traded in gold from the
region for centuries; but in 1886 Europeans ‘‘discovered’’ a seemingly
endless gold supply at Langlaagte in the Transvaal. This precipitated the
rapid development of the goldmining industry and further military
struggles, culminating in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, in which
Britain defeated the Afrikaner republics in the interior of the country.11
The year 1910 saw the launch of the Union of South Africa. Afrikaners
and English-speaking whites remained sharply divided along ethnic lines, a
legacy of the Anglo-Boer war, despite their political rights and privileges
over blacks. The South African government strove, over the following
decades, to bolster white dominance and to fragment the population along
sectional lines. The black population was categorized as African, Col-
oured, and Indian. The minority of the black population that enjoyed a
qualified franchise was systematically whittled away, while white men
and, from 1930, white women enjoyed the franchise and other democratic
rights. Government proposals to eliminate black rights were differentially
tailored for Africans, Coloureds, and Indians. Africans were subjected to
pass laws, and their right to live in towns was progressively eroded and
subjected to severe restrictions.
These racist laws did not go unchallenged. The year 1902 had seen the
10. Quoted in Ageron, Histoire de l’Alge´rie Contemporaine, p. 240.
11. Luli Callinicos, Gold and Workers, 1886–1924 (Johannesburg, 1981), pp. 8–9.
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launch of the African Political Organization – later renamed the African
People’s Organization (APO). Its political identity was ambiguous.
Calling for a qualified franchise for all men, regardless of colour, it
nonetheless styled itself as ‘‘an organization of the coloured people only’’,
with responsibility for ‘‘the rights and duties of the Coloured people [:::] as
distinguished from the native races’’.12 The year 1912 saw the formation of
the African political organization that transcended tribal identity – the
South African Native National Congress, precursor to the African
National Congress (ANC). Significantly, and in contrast to Algeria,
despite the increasing strictures placed on political activity aimed at the
extension of democratic rights, black South Africans were free to join
those political parties that would allow them membership, including the
Communist Party, until its banning in 1950.13
The quasicolonial status of Algeria, compared to South Africa’s political
autonomy, had implications for the respective communist parties. In
Algeria, communists were members of the French Communist Party
(Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de l’Internationale Communisme – SFIC) until 1936,
when an organizationally autonomous Algerian Communist Party was
formed; the relationship of communists in Algeria to the Comintern was
always mediated by the SFIC’s Paris headquarters until 1936. The French
Communist Party has been historically consumed by the idea of the
French nation, which was, in turn, shaped by the French Revolution; the
Party could also point to the revolutionary legacy of the Paris Commune
of 1871. On the one side, this meant that the French Communist Party’s
relationship with the Comintern was characterized by tension, as it sought,
not always successfully, to reconcile two revolutionary traditions.14 On
the other side, within the French Communist Party, Algerian issues and
concerns were repeatedly marginalized and subordinated to those of
France and to the idea of the French nation. By contrast, the Communist
Party of South Africa was founded in July 1921 as an autonomous party
that affiliated directly to the Comintern, notwithstanding the Communist
Party of Great Britain’s occasional intervention, at the Comintern’s
behest, in the CPSA’s affairs.
Moreover, the different patterns of proletarianization within the two
countries had implications for working-class development and organiza-
tion. French conquest of Algeria led to the seizure of fertile land from the
indigenous people for the establishment of large farms and wine estates. By
the start of twentieth century, many Algerians had lost their access to land
and rural poverty was widespread. About 32 per cent of the rural
12. Gavin Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African ‘‘Coloured’’ Politics
(Cape Town [etc.], 1987), p. 57.
13. Drew, Discordant Comrades, p. 200.
14. Marc Lazar, ‘‘The French Communist Party between Nation and Internationalism’’, in
Saarela and Rentola, Communism: National and International, pp. 41–59, esp. 44–46.
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population were sharecroppers and about 16 per cent were proletarianized.
Although 48.6 per cent of the rural population still farmed their own land,
the size and quality of land was insufficient for self-subsistence. This
meant that many freeholders supplemented their income by labour on
larger farms and by encouraging family members to work full-time or
part-time in the labour force. By 1914, wage labour was a characteristic
feature of colonial agricultural production. The rural proletariat, compris-
ing both Algerian and European workers, peaked in the 1920s and 1930s,
then shrank with the mechanization of European agriculture and the
slowing of agricultural production.15 The first years of the century also
saw a small but accelerating movement of people to cities to work in small
factories, workshops, and businesses, on docks, and in semiskilled and
unskilled public sector jobs. By 1905 these workers numbered about
50,000. In 1830 about 5 per cent of the Algerian population lived in cities;
before the First World War, this had risen to 8.5 per cent.16
Alongside the small movement to Algerian towns, migration to France
began in the early twentieth century in response to French industrializa-
tion, and increased during the First World War, as young French men left
for the war. Between 1907 and 1913 about 10,000 Kabyles responded to a
call from French industries, in spite of protests from large landowners
concerned about the difficulties of recruiting agricultural labourers. The
emigrants, overwhelmingly young men whose families remained in
Algeria, settled in ethnic communities within French cities.17 Algerian
workers in France could earn about three to four times what they could in
Algeria, enabling them to remit comparatively large sums to their families.
By the end of 1918, official census counts estimated about 57,000 Algerians
living in France. However, this was most likely an underestimation.
Bowing to pressure from large land-owners, or colons, concerned about
labour shortages, the government attempted to stem the exodus. The
Chautemps circular of 15 September 1924 imposed contractual conditions
on Algerians travelling to France by third or fourth class. Although the
Sarraut decree of 4 August 1926 confirmed the principle of freedom of
travel, a further decree on 4 April 1928 imposed a financial fee of Fr.125 on
those wishing to work in France. Yet, these measures failed to stop the
flow of emigrants. Official government figures suggest about 69,000
Algerians in France in 1926, and 80,000 in 1928. However, the figure is
probably closer to 100,000: between 1914 and 1928 there were 471,390
departures compared to 365,024 returns, suggesting that about 100,000
Algerians were living in France around 1928.18 Algerian workers who
went to France not atypically remained in that far less oppressive
15. Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins, pp. 98–99, 123.
16. Ibid., p. 125.
17. Ageron, Histoire de l’Alge´rie Contemporaine, p. 530.
18. Ibid., pp. 527–529.
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environment. Many of them joined trade unions and had contact with the
French Communist Party. Hence, Algeria was characterized by a
displaced proletariat. As one commentator has put it, ‘‘l’Alge´rie est une
socie´te´ dont le proletariat est en France’’.19
South Africa also had a significant migrant labour population. But while
Algerian workers migrated to France, African workers in South Africa
migrated within their country, most often to work on mines. British
capital had ‘‘discovered’’ South Africa’s mineral riches before a significant
proletariat existed; consequently, it had faced the crucial problem of
securing, socializing, and disciplining a labour force. Following the
mineral discoveries, both the colonial state and the capitalist class made
various attempts to induce and coerce labour, using colonial law and
taxation, as elsewhere in Africa. They settled on a policy of combining the
colonial reserve system, in which African ownership and occupation of
land was restricted to specified areas, with the use of migrant labour. The
introduction of private property in the reserves accelerated proletarianiza-
tion. The limitations on the size of land holdings stunted the growth of an
African farming class in the reserves and at the same time led to loss of land
holdings and to landlessness for many. By the early twentieth century
poverty was pushing Africans into the migrant labour system.20 This
process accelerated over the next several decades. By 1936, about 17 per
cent of Africans in South Africa were urbanized; including Coloureds and
Indians, the entire black South African population had an even higher
degree of urbanization. In contrast, close to 13 per cent of Algerians were
urbanized.
The greater urbanization of South Africa’s black population, compared
to Algerians, and the different patterns of proletarianization, provide
insight into the state of the working-class movement in these two
countries. Black South Africans had a longer history of collective
working-class activity, including strike activity, than Algerians. The
1910s was a decade of collective black working-class strike activity across
South Africa, culminating in the 1920 black mineworkers’ strike. This
strike activity had a strong impact on a very small number of South African
socialists who began to make initiatives towards black workers. More
significantly, the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’
Union (ICU) in 1919 as a union of black dockworkers signalled the growth
of a class-conscious black working class in the ports and, as the ICU
developed into a mass movement that swept across the country, demon-
strated the attraction of ideas of national liberation for blacks in both town
19. Pierre Bourdieu quoted in ibid., vol. 2, p. 526.
20. W.M. MacMillan, Africa Emergent: A Survey of Social, Political and Economic Trends in
British Africa (Harmondsworth, 1949), pp. 120–126.
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and countryside. By contrast, the first Algerian working-class organiza-
tion that embraced ideas of national liberation, the E´toile Nord-africaine
[North African Star], was founded by North African immigrants in Paris
in the mid-1920s and only established itself in Algeria in the 1930s. The
differential patterns of proletarianization, urbanization, and of working-
class development in these two countries meant that the prospective social
base from which the communist parties would first try to recruit
indigenous members – the Algerian or black urban working class – was
less developed in Algeria than in South Africa at a comparable period. A
comparative examination of the first variable, the political economy and
pattern of working-class formation in each society, suggests, accordingly,
that the conditions for indigenization would have been more difficult in
the Algerian case.
S O U T H A F R I C A ’ S E A R L Y S O C I A L I S T T R A D I T I O N A N D
T H E F O U N D I N G O F T H E C P S A
The communist parties in Algeria and South Africa, formed at the start of
the 1920s, faced very different political and socio-economic contexts. In
addition to their different organizational relationships with the communist
parties of their imperial metropoles, communists in Algeria and South
Africa had to come to terms with different socialist traditions. Indeed,
early recruits to each party bore the legacies of these prior traditions.
Although both parties adhered to the Comintern and came under its
centralizing powers, the Comintern’s ability to centralize and to
standardize the policies and practices of its sections was circumscribed
both by the diverse local contexts and by the different socialist traditions.
Moreover, the Comintern’s relationships with these local communists
reflected the geopolitics of the international communist movement. In its
early years, the Comintern’s attentions were focused primarily on
industrialized Europe, as the presumed base of international revolution,
and secondarily on Asia. Within Europe, Germany received much
attention; France, as a leading European power, was important, but its
colonies were far less so. For the Comintern, both colonized and
independent African countries were of low priority.21
The Comintern envisioned itself as the guiding force in an international
revolutionary movement; the Soviet Union was its paradigm for a
successful socialist revolution. At its Second Congress in July–August
1920, the Comintern adopted Twenty-one Points that placed the
Comintern at the centre of the international socialist struggle and
21. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International
Communism from Lenin to Stalin (Basingstoke, 1996), p. xxv.
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stipulated the conditions for affiliation.22 The Comintern’s activities were
directed by the ECCI, whose composition reflected the disproportionate
influence of the Russian Communist Party. The Twenty-one Points were
premised on the idea that class struggle in Europe and North America was
approaching civil war, an assumption already undermined by political
developments at the time of their adoption. All national sections were
expected to adhere to the Comintern’s policies, and within each national
section, factions were to be subordinated to the Central Committee.
Democratic centralism meant that the Party centre was to have ‘‘complete
power, authority and ample rights’’. Social-democratic and social-pacifist
principles were to be replaced with communist ones. Reformists and
centrists were to be removed from leadership posts in all labour
organizations in favour of communists, even at the costs of replacing
experienced with inexperienced personnel. Parties were to propagandize
against the International Federation of Trade Unions – also known as the
Amsterdam International – in support of a proposed Red International of
labour unions. These points were the subject of intense debate by socialists
around the world.23
However, between the Comintern’s formation in 1919 and its Second
Congress in July 1920, it began to re-examine its position on ‘‘the national
and colonial question’’. As the prospects of revolution in Europe waned,
anticolonial and national liberation struggles were seen as means to
weaken imperialism. A critical debate at the Second Congress concerned
the significance of national liberation movements for socialism. Lenin and
M.N. Roy of India were the main protagonists in the debate. Lenin argued
that the Comintern should seek temporary alliances with bourgeois
democratic movements in the colonies, while Roy stressed the difference
between bourgeois democratic movements and movements of peasants
and workers. Lenin conceded the politically ambivalent nature of
bourgeois democratic movements and changed his position to one of
support for national revolutionary, as opposed to bourgeois democratic,
movements.24
The Comintern’s requirements inevitably propelled changes in the
organizational structure of socialist groups seeking affiliation. In South
Africa, the tiny socialist movement was organizationally and ideologically
eclectic, reflecting the diverse influences of the British, Eastern European,
and American socialist traditions. The impact of the Comintern was to
22. ‘‘‘The Twenty-one Points – Conditions of Admission to the Communist International’ as
Adopted at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 and Appended to the Constitution of the
Communist Party of South Africa by its Founding Conference in 1921’’, in Brian Bunting (ed.),
South African Communists Speak, 1915–1980 (London, 1981), pp. 58–62.
23. Ibid., p. 60; McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, pp. 225–226.
24. Sheridan Johns, ‘‘The Comintern, South Africa and the Black Diaspora’’, Review of Politics,
37 (1975), pp. 200–234.
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initially inspire competition amongst the diverse South African groups for
its recognition, while simultaneously pulling them towards unity. In South
Africa, as elsewhere, the propulsion towards organizational unity was
linked to a movement to marginalize those approaches not favoured by the
Comintern.
South African socialists seem to have recognized the need for political
equality for, and organization of, the oppressed majority a few years
earlier than their Algerian counterparts. Whatever the differences amongst
South African socialists on how to achieve revolution – through
syndicalism, for instance, or political action – a common ground for
many by the late 1910s was their opposition to the colour bar. Admittedly,
aside from a handful, this did not take practical form. Galvanized by the
emergence of collective black working-class protest, from the mid-1910s a
handful of socialists had begun organizing black activists, forming an
organization called the Industrial Workers of Africa that was modelled on
the Industrial Workers of the World. Hence, the veteran socialist and
trade-unionist, Bill Andrews, could write to the English socialist and
feminist, Sylvia Pankhurst, that two South African socialist groups, the
International Socialist League and the Industrial Socialist League ‘‘clearly
and fearlessly [stand] by the principle that no revolution can be successful
without a recognition of the rights of the Native workers to full
participation’’.25
Debates amongst South African socialists inspired by their desire to
affiliate to the Comintern centred on the problem of centralization and the
relative weight of political agitation versus syndicalist organization. In
Cape Town, the Constitutional Socialist Society pulled out of unity talks
objecting to the idea of a proletarian dictatorship,26 and in Durban the
Social Democratic Party argued that the Twenty-one Points were anti-
democratic. It believed that the requirement to break with all labour
organizations that did not accept the Twenty-one Points would be divisive
for the working-class movement. It felt that the Comintern’s pressure for a
speedy decision regarding affiliation, and its insistence on subordinating
factions to central authority were antithetical to free thinking and
discussion, and would mean ‘‘constant suspicion, distrust, strife, and the
stifling of all personal generosity within any movement imbued with the
spirit of the Third International’’.27
25. Letter from W.H. Andrews to Sylvia Pankhurst, 19 March 1920, Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History (RGASPI), 495.64.1.
26. Sheridan Johns, ‘‘The Birth of the Communist Party of South Africa’’, The International
Journal of African Historical Studies, 9 (1976), pp. 371–400, esp. 386–389; Gideon Shimoni, Jews
and Zionism: the South African Experience (1910–1967) (Cape Town, 1980), p. 175; E.A.
Mantzaris, ‘‘The Promise of the Impossible Revolution: The Cape Town Industrial Socialist
League, 1918–1921’’, Studies in the History of Cape Town, 4 (1981), pp. 145–173, 164.
27. Johns, ‘‘The Birth of the Communist Party’’, pp. 391–393; Durban Social Democratic Party,
‘‘Socialist Unity in South Africa’’, The Communist Review, 1: 4 (August 1921), pp. 73–76.
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The appeal of the Russian Revolution, and the belief that its success was
a result of political action and, in consequence, could and should be
replicated in other countries, ultimately prevailed amongst South African
socialists. On 30 July 1921, the CPSA (Section of the Communist
International) was formed – after almost a year of discussion and planning
involving more than ten groups. The Durban SDP remained outside, but
constitutional amendments submitted at the conference, even if not
carried, indicated that it was not alone in its concerns about centralization.
Given the previously eclectic nature of the South African movement,
acceptance of the Twenty-one Points was a large leap. In the absence of an
organizationally embedded and strong socialist tradition, the delegates at
the new party’s launch represented the overwhelming majority of the
country’s socialists. But this was no more than 175 members out of
a country of seven million, and there is no doubt that they felt them-
selves immeasurably strengthened through their relationship with the
Comintern.28
Unity of the new party was seen as a necessary prelude to a greater unity
– solidarity of the working class across colour lines. In June 1920 Cape
Town socialist, Manny Lopes, had written that in addition ‘‘to the task of
fighting against the prejudices + ignorance of the masses (a task common to
the Communists of all lands) we have this terrible task of combatting the
widespread growth of race prejudice, nay even of race hatred’’.29 This view
was amplified by Sam Barlin and David Ivon Jones, the two South African
delegates to the Comintern’s Third Congress, on the eve of the CPSA’s
founding. They were keenly aware of the limitations imposed by the new
party’s social composition. Most communists and sympathizers were
members of white trade unions, and concerned to fight class collaboration
in those organizations, they explained, and restrictive laws made it difficult
for white communists to reach African workers. Barlin and Jones appealed
to the Comintern to send a representative to South Africa to study the
‘‘Negro question and its relation to the Communist Party’’, and to provide
financial assistance. ‘‘What is required’’, they argued, ‘‘is to assure
economic sustenance to a few native workers as agitators and organisers
[:::] to organise their brothers. This primitive mass is waiting to be
stirred.’’30
28. Johns, ‘‘The Birth of the Communist Party’’, pp. 397–399; Drew, Discordant Comrades,
p. 54.
29. Letter from M. Lopes, Industrial Socialist League of South Africa to Dear Comrade, 24 June
1920, RGASPI, Moscow, 495.64.1.
30. Memorandum to the Small Bureau of the Comintern on the situation in Africa from D. Ivon
Jones and Sam Barlin, South African delegation to the Third Congress of the Communist
International, 16 July 1921, 3, RGASPI, 495.64.25.
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F R E N C H S O C I A L I S M A N D T H E E A R L Y Y E A R S O F
C O M M U N I S M I N A L G E R I A
The socialist tradition in Algeria differed in marked respects from that of
South Africa. Marx himself had spent a few months in Algeria – for health
reasons – and Marx and Engels had written about the French conquest of
Algeria. Their work certainly recognized the horrors of the conquest and
the economic impact of colonization, although they did not consider
its political or cultural implications for the oppressed majority.31 How-
ever small it was, the socialist movement in Algeria reflected the
established and intellectual French socialist tradition and, organization-
ally, the more centralized French model of the Socialist Party (Section
Franc¸aise de l’Internationale Ouvrie`re – SFIO), alongside a weaker
anarchist tradition.32
An Algerian section of the French Socialist Party, reflecting the interests
of organized – overwhelmingly European – workers, was officially
launched in 1906. Its organ, Lutte Sociale, began in late 1907 as the organ of
the Socialist Party in Oran; this was a French-language publication with an
occasional article in Spanish, reflecting the significance of Spanish
immigrants in Oran. The following January Lutte Sociale announced the
first congress of the Fe´de´ration socialiste Alge´rienne, to be presided over
by Marcel Cachin, a socialist professor of philosophy and a founding
member of the SFIO, while he was on tour in Algeria. Cachin wrote about
the need to address the misery of Algerian workers, and, over the years,
articles in Lutte Sociale called for working-class unity across national
lines.33 But generally the French Socialist Party gave very little attention to
Algeria before 1914. The leading French socialist, Jean Jaure`s, saw the
liberation of Algerians in terms of their gradual assimilation into the
French polity, although the Socialist Party took no practical steps towards
that goal before the war.34 Even in 1920 an article in the Socialist Party’s
French-based organ, Le Populaire, presented the exploitation of European
workers as on a par with Jewish and Muslim workers, although another
31. Rene´ Gallissot, ‘‘Marx et l’Alge´rie’’, Le Mouvement Social, 71 (April–June 1970), pp. 39–63;
Rene´ Gallissot and Gilbert Badia (eds), Marx, Marxisme et Alge´rie (Paris, 1976), esp. pp. 383–
394; Mohamed Lakhdar Benhassine, ‘‘Le sejour de Karl Marx a` Alger [:::] du 20 Fevrier au 2 Mai
1882’’, in Alger: Lumie`res sur la Ville, Actes du Colloque (Algiers, 4–6 May 2002), pp. 713–729.
32. Charles-Robert Ageron, ‘‘Jaure`s et les socialistes franc¸ais devant la question alge´rienne (de
1895 a` 1914)’’, Le Mouvement Social, 42 (1963), pp. 3–27; Ahmed Koulakssis, Le Parti Socialiste
et l’Afrique du Nord de Jaure`s a` Blum (Paris, 1991).
33. ‘‘Fe´de´ration Socialiste Alge´rienne’’, Lutte Sociale, no. 8, 19 (January 1908) (with Lutte
Sociale, 1912, 1919–1920, Bibliothe`que National Franc¸aise); Marcel Cachin, ‘‘Questions
Alge´riens’’, Lutte Sociale, 7–12 January 1912; Tiberius Gracchus, ‘‘Prole´taires Alge´riens
unissons-nous!’’, Lutte Sociale, 20 April 1919; Koulakssis, Le Parti Socialiste, p. 124, cf. p.
311, n. 61.
34. Ageron, ‘‘Jaure`s et les socialistes franc¸ais’’, pp. 27–29.
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piece spoke out against the ‘‘odious’’ indige´nat.35 However, in marked
contrast to South Africa, French socialists could point to an indigenous
French revolutionary tradition – both the democratic tradition symbol-
ized by the French Revolution and the revolutionary and socialist tradition
symbolized by the Paris Commune. With the formation of the French
Communist Party, French communists could lay claim to both the French
and the Bolshevik revolutionary heritages.
Communism in Algeria, as in South Africa, was born in seemingly
auspicious circumstances.36 The First World War precipitated a growth in
the working-class movement in urban Algeria, as it did in South Africa.
Trade-union membership increased rapidly in these years, doubling in the
Department of Alger and more than tripling in the Department of Oran.
The workers’ press, which had vanished during the war, revived between
1918 and 1920. In Algeria, the Socialist Party – out of whose ranks most
communists would come – counted close to 1,000 members in 1920, before
the founding of the French Communist Party. Individual socialists were
prominent in the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, which called for the
greatest possible extension of Algerian representation both in local
assemblies and in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. A wave of
strikes and demonstrations in the springs of 1919 and 1920 had raised the
hopes of many socialists for the unity of Algerian and European workers,
although it was clear that forging such unity would be far from easy. The
presence of Algerian workers amongst the demonstrators inevitably
sparked a wave of hysteria in the local press about a combined Bolshevik
and Muslim threat. Despite this, the founding members of the Communist
Party in Algeria were optimistic. In subsequent communist discourse,
Jean-Louis Planche has noted, the strike waves of 1919 and 1920 became
legendary.37
In Algeria, however, discussion of the Twenty-one Points was much
briefer than in South Africa. This was in part due to the earlier founding of
the French Communist Party, launched in December 1920 at the Congress
of Tours, precluding lengthy discussion beforehand. Not surprisingly,
therefore, shortly after the Party’s formation, critical but unresolved issues
exploded into the open in Algeria. These concerned two of the Twenty-
35. Koulakssis, Le Parti Socialiste, pp. 118–119.
36. Alexandre Juving, Le Socialisme en Alge´rie (Algiers, 1924), esp. pp. 258–277; Charles-
Robert Ageron, ‘‘Les communistes franc¸ais devant la question alge´rienne de 1921 a` 1924’’, Le
Mouvement Social, 78 (1972), pp. 7–37, 11; Gilbert Meynier, L’Alge´rie Re´ve´le´e: La guerre de
1914–1918 et le premier quart du XX sie`cle (Geneva, 1981), esp. pp. 690–709; Ahmed Koulakssis
and Gilbert Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie au lendemain de
la premie`re guerre mondiale’’, Le Mouvement Social, 130 (1985), pp. 3–32, 4–5.
37. Jean-Louis Planche, ‘‘L’internationalisme au feu des nationalismes: les communistes en
Alge´rie (1920-1945)’’, in Abdeljelil Temimi (ed.), Me´langes Charles-Robert Ageron, vol. 2
(Zaghouan, 1996), pp. 661–688, 663.
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one Points, which were relevant to the Party’s position on colonialism.
The first was Point 8, which read in part:
Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to
denounce without any reserve all methods of ‘‘its own’’ imperialists in the
colonies, supporting, not only in words but practically, all movements of
liberation in the colonies. It should demand the expulsion of its own imperialists
from such colonies.
The other was Point 16, which insisted on a high degree of centralization
but acknowledged that ‘‘the Communist International and the Executive
Committee are, naturally, bound in every form of their activity to consider
the variety of conditions under which the different parties have to work
and struggle’’.38 The Twenty-one Points were first published in L’Huma-
nite´, the Paris-based organ of the French Communist Party, on 8 October
1920, and appeared in Lutte Sociale on 18 November. The delegate
representing Algeria at Tours, Charles-Andre´ Julien, a socialist regional
councillor from Oran, had been instructed to discuss Points 8 and 16 –
many aspiring communists in Algeria had expressed grave concern over
them. But a telegram from the Comintern during the congress dominated
the subsequent proceedings; discussion of the colonial question was
abridged. Affiliation to the Comintern was therefore approved without
thorough discussion of these two points. At the time, this did not cause
undue concern for communists in Algeria: from their perspective, Point 8’s
stipulation of the expulsion of imperialists from the colonies was mediated
by Point 16’s recognition of local diversity. The mandates from Algeria –
representing entirely Europeans – overwhelmingly supported affiliation
to the Comintern. At its foundation, the SFIC in Algeria was organized
into three federations – of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine – reflecting the
French government’s division of the country into three administrative
departments.39
By April 1921, it was apparent that, for communists in Algeria, issues
surrounding anticolonial struggle and social revolution were far from
resolved. The views of Dr Louis Laurens, a medical doctor from
Constantine and secretary of the local communist federation, were
influential and far from unrepresentative. Laurens argued that a socialist
France would facilitate Franco-Algerian cooperation and enable French
38. ‘‘The Twenty-one Points’’, in Bunting, South African Communists Speak, pp. 60–61.
39. The Socialist Party’s membership in Algeria was decimated. It appears to have been wiped
out in Constantine; by 1924 the Algiers section had 375 members; see Koulakssis, Le Parti
Socialiste, pp. 126–128, 139, 312, nn. 71, 72; Ageron, ‘‘Les communistes franc¸ais devant la
question alge´rienne’’, p. 11; Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les
communistes d’Alge´rie’’, pp. 5–6; Jacques Choukron, ‘‘L’internationale communiste, le PC
Franc¸ais et l’Alge´rie (1920–1925)’’, Cahiers d’histoire de l’Institut Maurice Thorez, 25–26, 2e`me
trimestre, pp. 133–159, 136.
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civilization to play the educational role necessary for Algerian develop-
ment.40 A similar view was reflected in a thesis put forward in April 1921
by the communist section of Sidi-bel-Abbes – a working-class town,
known as the Red Mecca, that was located in the Department of Oran.
Situated in the western part of the country across from Spain, Oran had a
relatively high proportion of Spanish working-class immigrants. The Sidi-
bel-Abbes thesis deprecated the role of indigenous elites, who were seen as
representing a step backwards towards feudalism. It argued that a social
revolution in Algeria was predicated on a prior socialist revolution in
France, concluding that the Communist Party in Algeria should promote
trade-union organization and communist propaganda, but should reject
the ‘‘abandonment of the colonies’’ suggested by Point 8.41
But there were other emphases amongst local communists.42 Djerjer-
aoui – ‘‘a native communist’’ – argued that communism was the only
doctrine able to satisfy Algerians’ needs for equality.43 In 1921, Victor
Spielmann, a long-time radical who defended the cause of the small against
the large and who belonged both to the SFIC and to Emir Khaled’s
Fraternite´ alge´rienne, launched a series on ‘‘la question indige`ne’’ in Lutte
Sociale – now the organ of the local SFIC. The next year, Spielmann
published a brochure on colonization and its impact on Algerians that
Lutte Sociale urged all comrades to read.44 Nonetheless, in the early 1920s
the pages of Lutte Sociale were still clearly aimed at a European audience.
With small print and no photos or illustrations, it required a high degree of
French literacy. Its pages referred to the French and Russian revolutionary
traditions and to issues concerning European workers; there was scant
information on issues relating to colonial oppression or Algerian rights.
There were individual communists who were concerned about the
French Communist Party’s European orientation in Algeria. Charles-
Andre´ Julien, who attended the Third Comintern Congress in June–July
1921 as the North African delegate, was a notable example. Both M.N.
Roy and Julien criticized what they felt was the marginalization of colonial
issues at the Third Congress. Julien was clearly aware of the obstacles to
building communism in Algeria, not least of which was, as he put it, the
40. Louis Laurens, ‘‘Les aspects du socialisme en Alge´rie’’ (4), Lutte Sociale, 30 April 1921.
41. ‘‘Ordre du jour vote´ par la Section socialiste (SFIC) de Sidi-Bel-Abbes dans sa reunion du 22
Avril 1921’’, Lutte Sociale, 7 May 1921; Sivan, Communisme et Nationalisme en Alge´rie, pp. 25–
26; Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie’’, pp. 7–8;
Ageron, ‘‘Les communistes franc¸ais devant la question alge´rienne’’, p. 17.
42. Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie’’.
43. Djerjeraoui (Communiste indige`ne), ‘‘Le communisme et l’indige`ne’’, Lutte Sociale, 7
January 1922.
44. ‘‘E´tudes Alge´riennes’’, Lutte Sociale, 11 March 1922; Victor Spielmann, Colonisation et
Question Indige`ne en Alge´rie en 1922 (Algiers, 1922); ‘‘Victor Spielmann’’, in Dictionnaire
Biographique du Mouvement ouvrier franc¸ais, part 4, 1914–1939, vol. 41 (Paris, 1992), pp. 403–
404.
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scarcely disguised hostility of European communists in North Africa
towards the indigenous majority. He insisted on the specificity of capitalist
development in what he called the East, as opposed to the West. While
capitalism had transformed social relations and led to the formation of an
urban working class in Western countries, Julien contended, in the East
capitalist development had produced agricultural workers rather than
urban proletarians and left intact the privileged elites, whose interests lay
with capitalism. The petite bourgeoisie or intellectuals were anticapitalist,
however; accordingly, they had common interests with urban and rural
workers. Communists needed to recognize that the struggle against
imperialism included all these classes, he argued, and as aspirations for
national independence had grown since the end of the War, the national
question would be of first importance in the anti-imperialist struggle. In
addition to engaging in purely communist activity, Julien concluded,
communists must provide guidance to national liberation movements,
while also pointing out to oppressed workers that their interests lay with
communists rather than national elites. But Julien’s views were very much
in a minority amongst communists in Algeria. Significantly, his views were
not endorsed by the other French delegates to the Congress; one of them
pointedly dissociated the French delegation from Julien’s intervention.45
In August 1921, under the Comintern’s influence, the French Commu-
nist Party established a Paris-based consultative body known as the Comite´
d’e´tudes coloniales. Its purpose was to study conditions in the colonized
areas, with a view to creating movements against capitalism, militarism, and
imperialism.46 This was headed by Paul Vaillant-Couturier, a supporter of
Lenin’s views on colonial liberation. In March 1922, Vaillant-Couturier
made a propaganda trip to Algeria, sweeping through nineteen cities, with
twenty-three meetings in twenty-two days. Algeria, he wrote in Lutte
Sociale, was a scandalous land, where imprisonment and political assassina-
tion were used against the indigenous masses by those who had stolen the
country.47 Yet, his paradigm assumed the primacy of revolution in Europe.
The only security for the European population, he argued, was the
education of the Algerian population in a North Africa liberated by
international revolution; a victorious revolution in the metropole would
lay the basis for a federated system of republics in North Africa.48 On
45. Charles-Andre´ Julien, H. Carre`re d’Encausse, and M. Rebe´roiux, ‘‘Les Communistes et
l’Orient en 1921’’, Le Mouvement Social, 82 (1973), pp. 106–113.
46. Comite´ d’e´tudes coloniales, ‘‘Projet de resolution sur le Communisme et les colonies’’, Lutte
Sociale, 4 February 1922, p. 4. The committee was formally approved at the SFIC’s congress in
Marseilles in December.
47. P. Vaillant-Couturier, ‘‘Vive l’Alge´rie Re´volutionnaire’’, Lutte Sociale, 1 April 1922; Ageron,
‘‘Les communistes franc¸ais devant la question alge´rienne’’, pp. 23–24, 29–30; Choukron,
‘‘L’internationale communiste’’, p. 146; Choukron dates the trip to February 1922.
48. P. Vaillant-Couturier, ‘‘Le proble`me indige`ne’’, Lutte Sociale, 4 March 1922.
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Vaillant-Couturier’s return to Paris, he published a series of articles on
‘‘L’impe´rialisme franc¸ais en Alge´rie’’ in L’Humanite´, which in critical
respects reflected the dominant point of view of the local Algerian
communists. Under his direction, the Comite´ d’e´tudes coloniales evidently
refrained from publishing the Comintern’s Appel pour la libe´ration de
l’Alge´rie et de la Tunisie of 20 May 1922 so as to avoid putting undue
pressure on the comrades in Algeria. It did, however, call for greater work
amongst the Algerian population, and for the publication of political tracts
in Arabic. But this stance did not satisfy the Algerian federations, which felt
that Paris did not take their perspectives sufficiently into account.49
The Algerian sections opposed the Comintern’s call for liberation in
North Africa. The Sidi-bel-Abbes section argued that diverse colonial
conditions negated the viability of a single thesis on the colonial question;
that only local communist federations were qualified to develop local
communist tactics; and that the Algerian sections would not agree to
disseminate propaganda material relevant to their situation that they had
not had the opportunity to see and approve. It maintained that a Muslim
revolution would entail a return to feudalism, that revolution in France
was a precondition for national emancipation in Algeria, and, accordingly,
that propaganda aimed directly at Algerians would backfire. Similar views
were voiced at the second interfederal Congress of North Africa on 24
September 1922, which rejected the Comintern’s general propositions in
the name of local specificities, and concluded that it was impossible to
build a national liberation movement in Algeria at that point.50
There was, nonetheless, some Algerian interest in the Party’s activities.
A communist antiwar demonstration on 21 May 1922 drew about 300–400
people, including many young people, a few women, and about 50 Arabs,
reported the British Consul-General in Algiers.51 Lutte Sociale published
occasional articles on the need to reach Algerian workers. A piece by
trade-unionist, A. Boye, urged European workers to ‘‘think of our native
comrade as a brother [:::] more unhappy than us because he carries the
marks of long years of oppression’’, and as ‘‘a victim of our common
enemy: international capitalism’’.52 Similarly, Victor Spielmann continued
his columns on the ‘‘native question’’. Nonetheless, such efforts remained
in the minority.
With international socialism clearly in retreat, the main issues at the
Fourth Comintern Congress in November–December 1922 were ‘‘im-
49. Ageron, ‘‘Les communistes franc¸ais devant la question alge´rienne’’, pp. 26–28, 27.
50. Ibid., pp. 29–30; Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes
d’Alge´rie’’, p. 6; Choukron, ‘‘L’internationale communiste’’, p. 137.
51. Report from Consul-General Cave (Algiers), 22 May 1922, FO 371/8271 [W4486], Public
Record Office, London.
52. A. Boye, Secre´taire, Pour la CA de l’UDUA, ‘‘Vie syndicale: L’ouvrier indige`ne’’, Lutte
Sociale, 15 September 1922.
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mediate demands’’ and ‘‘united fronts’’; the Comintern also placed greater
emphasis on the national and colonial question, as well as the struggle for
black liberation. Not surprisingly the SFIC’s failure to promote Point 8
roused the Comintern’s criticism. Leon Trotsky played a central role in the
relationship between the Comintern and the SFIC; at the Fourth Congress
Trotsky castigated the Sidi-bel-Abbes thesis as representing the mentality
of slave owners. The repudiation evidently caused shock waves amongst
the local communists. In December 1922, Maxime Guillon, Secretary of
the Sidi-bel-Abbes region, and of the Algerian interfederation, and author
of the Sidi-bel-Abbes thesis, resigned from the Communist Party; a spate
of resignations followed in the Oran region.53 Party membership dropped
to about 530, about half what it had been at its foundation.54 The transition
was marked by the departure of intellectuals and members of the liberal
professions from the leadership of the local party: Maxime Guillon and
Charles-Andre´ Julien of Oran, both teachers, and Dr Louis Laurens of
Constantine. The regional balance of power shifted as Oran lost its status
in the interfederation. E´tienne Mazoyer, an Algiers railway worker, took
over leadership of the interfederation, symbolizing the growing dom-
inance of the region of Algiers and of workers. Concerned to follow the
Comintern, Mazoyer promised greater attention to the colonial question
and to Algerian recruitment. New names became prominent in the pages
of Lutte Sociale.55
The next two years saw greater attention to Algerian issues. In 1922,
Lutte Sociale’s pages were still ambivalent about the value of a national
movement, and apparently racist pleasantries could be found.56 An article
by a certain Mekloub exhorted young Algerians to leave their national
associations and join workers’ organizations, the only places, he con-
tended, where men opposed to all forms of international exploitation
could be found.57 But the next year saw somewhat greater concern with
53. Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History, p. 380; Sivan, Communisme et Nationalisme en Alge´rie,
pp. 28–30; Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie’’,
p. 16.
54. According to Choukron, ‘‘L’internationale communiste’’, p. 146, Algiers had 350 members,
of whom 250 had 8 stamps on their card, Oran had 100 members with 8 stamps, and Constantine
80 with 8 stamps. Thus there were about 430 members in all who paid dues regularly, indicating a
serious loss of members – of about half since 1920.
55. Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie’’, pp. 21–
23, suggest that as those with a trade-union background replaced the first generation of
intellectual leaders, their concern with rebuilding working-class unity across national lines after
the set-backs of 1921 coincided with the desire to improve their profile in the Comintern’s eyes.
56. For example, ‘‘Le carnet de Kaddour’’, Lutte Sociale, 10 April 1922. Kaddour purported to be
the ‘‘native editor’’ of Lutte Sociale, writing in a barely comprehensible French, possibly
reflecting a French stereotype about who could speak the French language.
57. Mekloub, ‘‘Pour de´velopper le Communisme en Alge´rie’’, Lutte Sociale, 21 April 1922.
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Algerian rights.58 Lutte Sociale published more articles on local conditions,
such as rural famine, and issues relevant to the Algerian population, such as
the indige´nat.59 From 16 November 1923, the paper’s sub-title became
Journal Communiste Alge´rien, and it ran the slogan ‘‘workers of all lands
unite’’ in both French and Arabic. It advertised initiatives such as the
Comite´ Alge´rie de secours aux indige`nes [Algerian Committee for Aid to
Natives], launched in February 1923 by Drs Belqacem Benthami and
Abdennour Tamzali, both leading members of the Jeunes Alge´riens, and of
which communist Victor Spielmann was Treasurer-General. January 1924
saw the launch of the Cercle Franco-Indige`ne Nord-Africain – the idea for
which had first been mooted in 1921. Organized by Victor Spielmann and
Dji Taleb, it aimed at a rapprochement of Europeans and Algerians and for
a gradual extension of Algerian rights – ‘‘while safeguarding and
consolidating the development of French influence’’!60 The year 1924 also
saw the publication of a pamphlet called the ABC du syndicalisme [ABC of
trade unionism], by R.A. Cre´mieux and dedicated to E´tienne Mazoyer.
Cre´mieux was scathingly critical of racist sentiments – both anti-Semitism
and anti-Algerian racism – amongst European workers. To those Euro-
pean workers who argued that ‘‘Le syndicalisme est bon, mais pas pour les
indige`nes!’’, Cre´mieux retorted: ‘‘Travailleurs de tous pays, unissez-vous
[:::]. Meˆme et surtout, les indige`nes!’’ This was a clear indication that by
1924 some communists, even if a minority, were concerned to organize
workers in Algeria into a movement embracing both Europeans and
Algerians.61
The Comintern’s intervention regarding the allegedly slave-owning
mentality of European communists in Algeria reflected its own dynamics
with the French Communist Party – notably its belief that the SFIC was
slow in following its directives. That the Comintern did not intervene over
this issue in the CPSA at that time did not mean that such attitudes were
absent in the South African section. The Sidi-bel-Abbe`s episode has
coloured subsequent historical interpretations of the Communist Party in
Algeria. Its failure to grow and to indigenize for many years has been
attributed largely to the supposed slave-owning mentality of the early
58. Ali Abdulhak, delegue au 4ie`me Congres de l’Internationale, ‘‘Aux travailleurs d’Alge´rie’’,
Lutte Sociale, 6 April 1923.
59. Lutte Sociale, 6 April and 26 October 1923. An article on the condition of women in the
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61. R.A. Cre´mieux, ABC of Syndicalisme (Algiers, 1924), esp. pp. 24–30 and quote 30.
186 Allison Drew
communists.62 Many, if not most, of these early communists may well
have had patronizing and racist attitudes towards the Algerian majority.
Yet, even after the Sidi-bel-Abbes thesis had been officially rejected, its
proponents marginalized, and greater attention placed on the recruitment
of Algerians, the Party had great difficulties in recruiting an Algerian
membership. By late 1925 Algerians numbered approximately 310 out of
1,540 members, or about 25 per cent of the total; this figure was higher
than in the following years. A report of January 1927 indicated that before
the Congress of Lille the Party had had 80 Muslim members but that they
had since left.63 By contrast, while the CPSA had only one African
member up to 1925, by 1928 it claimed about 1,600 African members out
of approximately 1,750.64 The differential experiences of the communist
parties in Algeria and South Africa with regard to indigenization cannot be
explained solely by the racial or nationalist attitudes of local communists.
T H E C P S A , B O L S H E V I Z A T I O N , A N D T H E T U R N T O B L A C K
L A B O U R
The Comintern introduced the Bolshevization policy at its Fifth Congress
in 1924; the ECCI amended it the following year. The policy was a
reaction to the defeat of the attempted German revolution in 1923, a defeat
that compelled Bolsheviks to reassess their thinking on the prospects of
further social revolution in Europe and across the world. It also reflected
the ongoing power struggles in the Russian Communist Party between the
Zinoviev–Kamenev–Stalin triumvirate, on the one side, and Leon
Trotsky, on the other. Led by Zinoviev, the ECCI decided that the fiasco
in Germany was due to a ‘‘right deviationist’’ leadership that had been soft
on social democracy – and to which failure the triumvirate strove to link
Trotsky. Bolshevization was an attempted left turn to counteract the
62. Sivan, Communisme et Nationalisme en Alge´rie, pp. 13–36. But Koulakssis and Meynier,
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any possibility of working-class solidarity and intensified racism. Koulakssis and Meynier, ‘‘Sur
le mouvement ouvrier et les communistes d’Alge´rie’’, p. 32, argue that the views expressed by
local communists in the early 1920s were less uniform than has been previously presented, that
support for the Sidi-bel-Abbes thesis was not unanimous, and that the rise of a new leadership
seeking to build working-class unity across national lines preceded the Comintern’s interven-
tion.
63. P. Biboulet, Region Communiste d’Alge´rie, 17 October 1925, typed ms, Archives du Parti
Communiste Franc¸ais (PCF), microfilm, file 172; Proce`s-verbal de la re´union de la Commission
Colonial Centrale, 17 January 1927, PCF file 241.
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alleged right deviation. The ECCI argued that successful revolution was
premised on the national sections applying the, ostensibly successful,
Bolshevik model to their own situation. Ironically, the failure of
revolution in Germany, by confirming Russian isolation, gave greater
credibility to the Soviet experience. The Bolshevization policy, therefore,
reflected the growing hegemony of the Russian Communist Party within
the Comintern.65
The Fifth Comintern Congress mandated that a Bolshevized party
‘‘must be a real mass party’’, and ‘‘must be a centralized party, permitting
no fractions, tendencies or groups’’.66 In the ECCI’s words, Bolsheviza-
tion meant ‘‘the application of the general principles of Leninism to the
concrete situation of the given country’’. Necessitating ‘‘iron party
discipline’’, it was ‘‘a permanent and continuing process’’, which had only
just begun ‘‘in the best European parties of the Comintern’’.67 The old style
of social-democratic organization, in which a few branch members did the
work while the majority were inactive, was deemed unacceptable. A
Bolshevik party was to be governed by a Central Committee. The line of
command was to run from the Central Committee to district committees
and then to local groups. Communists in trade unions and similar bodies
were to form fractions to advance party policy and to win elections to
official posts. Party members within a specific workplace were required to
form a nucleus and act under party discipline. The accent on building a
‘‘mass party’’ had particular implications for communist parties in settler
societies where the working class was divided along ethnic lines. In such
cases, communist parties were actively to recruit members from the
oppressed sections of the local population, so that the Party would be
demographically representative of the entire population, and not simply
reflect the interests of the more privileged stratum of the workforce. In
other words, the recruitment of workers across ethnic lines was a logical
consequence of Bolshevization.
Until the mid-1920s, the CPSA’s position on black workers was
ambiguous. Trade-union organization dated from the late nineteenth
century, as white workers from overseas, lured by the diamond and
goldmining industries, brought their craft-union traditions with them. But
within the context of a colonial conquest society, craft-based exclusion
became transformed into racial exclusion, a practice that continued into
the industrial era. Within six months of its formation, the CPSA was jolted
by the realities of South Africa’s racial politics. The 1922 Rand Revolt, an
uprising of white working-class people that began as a strike of white
65. Ibid., p. 76.
66. McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, pp. 44–46, quotes 46; Henry Pelling, The British
Communist Party: A Historical Profile (London, 1958), pp. 21–22.
67. ‘‘Theses on the Bolshevisation of Communist Parties, adopted by the Fifth ECCI Plenum,
April 1925’’, in McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern, pp. 232–233, quotes 233.
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mineworkers, starkly exposed the racial divisions of South Africa’s labour
force. A now notorious banner held aloft by white male workers and their
wives proclaimed ‘‘Workers of the World Fight and Unite for a White
SA’’.68
The 1922 Rand Revolt had a deeply traumatizing impact on commu-
nists. Sidney Bunting, an Oxford-educated lawyer, and a founding
member of the CPSA, tried to straddle and unite both black and white
sections of the labour movement. This aim flowed from his belief that
discord across the colour line was the main obstacle to the overthrow of
capitalism. Bunting saw the struggle for equal rights as a pragmatic step to
achieving working-class solidarity across the colour line: ‘‘inasmuch as
inequality is a bar to cooperation’’, he argued in October 1922, ‘‘an attempt
must be made before, not after, the revolution to mitigate it so far as
necessary to facilitate cooperation’’.69 Bunting’s initial optimism that the
state’s brutal squashing of the Rand Revolt would induce white workers to
seek solidarity with black workers was misguided.70 White racism
increased in the next few years. White workers, reported Bunting to the
Comintern, still had a ‘‘damned nigger’’ attitude.71
Proponents of work amongst blacks – chiefly Bunting, a few Young
Communist League members from Johannesburg, and some of the Cape
Town branch – had been marginalized by the Rand Revolt and the state’s
brutal reaction. Black leaders had been hostile to white miners in the Rand
Revolt. The views of Dr Abdurahman, President of the APO, who claimed
that ‘‘the greatest exploiters of coloured labour on the Rand are the white
workers, and their ‘solidarity’ has resulted in our being kept down at
unskilled work’’, was not atypical.72 But the trauma of the Rand Revolt
was still vividly felt by Johannesburg communists, and articles about the
Revolt and tributes to those who had died – ‘‘class-war heroes’’ – figured
prominently in March 1923, the first anniversary of the strike’s defeat.73
At its Second Congress, held in Johannesburg in April 1923, the CPSA
adopted the Comintern’s united-front policy, and voted to apply for
affiliation to the Labour Party.74 Despite the Labour Party’s subsequent
68. Drew, Discordant Comrades, pp. 13–16, 20–57, 59–64.
69. S.P. Bunting, ‘‘The ‘Colonial’ Labour Front, 23 October 1922’’, in Allison Drew (ed.), South
Africa’s Radical Tradition: A Documentary History, vol. 1 (Cape Town [etc.], 1996), pp. 51–54, 53.
70. S.P. Bunting, ‘‘The Rand Revolt: Causes and Effects’’, R.K. Cope Papers, A953/6a,
Historical Papers Library, University of the Witwaterstand, p. 23.
71. Letter from S.P. Bunting to I. Amter, Communist International, 24 November 1923,
RGASPI, 495.64.14; Eddie Roux and Win Roux, Rebel Pity: The Life of Eddie Roux (London,
1970), p. 26.
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73. International, 9 March 1923, pp. 1–2.
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rejection of communist overtures,75 the CPSA supported the electoral pact
of the National and Labour Parties against Jan Smut’s brutally antiwork-
ing-class South African Party. ‘‘Vote Pact’’, urged a CPSA manifesto
which appeared in May 1924, about a month before the election, ‘‘not for
the sake of the ‘Pact’ but [:::] as a step towards WORKERS’ CONTROL
OF THE WHOLE MEANS OF PRODUCTION and SELF-DETER-
MINATION IN A WORKERS’ REPUBLIC!’’76
The Party’s stance towards black organizations during this period was
equivocal: while believing the ANC to be dominated by ‘‘instruments of
the ruling class’’, it was unsure whether the ICU was a ‘‘fit and proper
body’’ to deal with its own agenda.77 The huge educational and skills
differential between blacks and whites meant that the Party found it very
difficult to find and recruit African organizers and this, from Bunting’s
point of view, impeded the Party’s organizing efforts. ‘‘But the best
propaganda’’, he informed the Comintern, ‘‘will be not by Communists as
such, but a case in which in a strike of natives the white workers openly
stand by them.’’78 However, it became clear that the new Pact government
was just as racist as its predecessor, dousing hopes that white labour
organizations would reach out to blacks.79 The entrenched racism of white
trade unions strengthened the hand of those wishing to give more attention
to the organization of black workers. The contest came to a head at the
Party’s Third Congress, held in Johannesburg in December 1924.
The CPSA’s turn to black labour in the mid-1920s was facilitated by the
entry of a number of young people into the socialist movement who were
concerned with organizing those outside the traditional orbit of trade
unions: black and women workers. The Young Communist League was
pivotal in the Party’s turn towards black labour, despite its all-white, and
mostly male, membership; it was, perhaps, less imprisoned within the
routines and outlook of organized white workers. Its members, workers,
clerks, and shop assistants, and a few students, became swept up in the
waves of meetings and demonstrations during the Rand Revolt and in the
campaign to free the Rand strikers after the revolt. By early 1924, two
Young Communist League members, Willie Kalk and Eddie Roux,
convinced the league to admit blacks. The league’s turn to blacks
dovetailed with the Comintern’s growing interest in the Negro question;
75. ‘‘Affiliation with the LP’’, International, 25 May 1923, p. 2; ‘‘Keep out the Communists: SA
Labour Party Baulks Again’’, and ‘‘Communist Affiliation: Letter from the Labour Party’’, both
in International, 27 July 1923, pp. 2 and 4 respectively. See also R.K. Cope, Comrade Bill: The
Life and Times of W.H. Andrews, Workers’ Leader (Cape Town, 1944), pp. 286–287.
76. ‘‘Communist Party, SA: Election Manifesto’’, International, 16 May 1923, pp. 6–7.
77. ‘‘An ‘African Labour Federation’’’, International, 11 January 1924, p. 3.
78. S.P. Bunting, to I. Amter, Communist International, 24 November 1923, RGASPI,
495.64.14.
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Roux reported the situation to the Young Communist International,
which sealed the matter by endorsing the proposal to recruit blacks.80
The debate in the Young Communist League parallelled the contest
within the CPSA, which culminated at the Party’s Third Congress. ‘‘[I]f
our Conference accomplishes no more than to remove mutual aloofness on
the subject of native affairs, it will have justified itself’’, argued Bunting.
The entire labour movement, he went on, ‘‘is paralysed and stultified by its
failure to tackle its native question’’. The CPSA ‘‘should strenuously resist
any tendency to a similar paralysis’’. The Congress resolved not to apply
for affiliation to the Labour Party but instead to work towards a united
front. Crucially, the Congress decided ‘‘that the overthrow of capitalism
can only be achieved through the joint endeavours of all the workers’’, and
it ‘‘urge[d] all branches to help to the utmost all the attempts of the native
workers to organise industrially’’.81 Its programme demanded the aboli-
tion of the indentured labour and pass systems and the repeal of
restrictions on the right to strike; ‘‘equal pay for equal work’’, regardless
of colour, sex, or age; the nationalization of mines and banks; the
expropriation of big estates in favour of landless workers and the provision
of land for Africans; and votes for women. The Congress was a victory for
those seeking greater attention to black workers.82
The Party’s decision in December 1924 actively to recruit black workers
led to significant changes. Crucially, Bunting used the organizational
reforms mandated by Bolshevization as a mechanism to launch and to
legitimize the turn to black workers. The year 1925 was difficult for the
CPSA as it introduced both agendas. Discussions about the reorganization
began in force in the second half of the year. Two British communists,
Jimmy and Violet Shields, spent several years in South Africa, helping the
Party to introduce the new policy. The proposed organizational changes
were initially limited to the regularization of agendas for monthly
meetings and the setting up of specified duties and study classes for
members, although over the next year changes were stepped up.83
Problems with the new orientation were already apparent by the
CPSA’s Fourth National Conference in Cape Town in December 1925.
The shift towards black workers inevitably antagonized white workers,
80. Roux and Roux, Rebel Pity, pp. 24–28, 30–37; ‘‘Young Communist Notes’’, International, 9
May 1924, p. 8; ‘‘Young Communist Notes’’, International, 18 July 1924, p. 8; ‘‘Our Social
Composition’’, Young Worker, II, 1, January 1924, p. 4.
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pp. 104–106.
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and alienated many of the Party’s white followers and active members.
There was a high turnover both in the general membership and on the
Central Executive.84 But these difficulties should not deter a true
Bolshevik Party, Bunting argued. ‘‘Bolshevization’’, he exhorted, ‘‘consists
in espousing the cause of the native workers. The SALP has no future
although the ‘white S. Africa’ slogan is still popular with whites on the
Rand’’.85 The debate at the Fourth National Conference reflected a
diversity of views on the matter. Nonetheless, Bunting was emphatic. ‘‘It
still remains that many of our members are reluctant in this matter – our
most Bolshevik work’’, observed Bunting. ‘‘If carrying on this work
offends the white trade unionists we should still go ahead with it.’’86
The Party launched a series of activities geared to attract black workers:
night school, trade-union work, meetings, and public gatherings. Until
1925, William Thibedi had been the Party’s only African member. By
1928, it claimed about 1,600 African members out of approximately 1,750,
and in the middle to late 1920s it recruited a number of significant black
leaders. Many of those who rose up the hierarchy came from a background
where education was valued, and a number were teachers. However, the
majority of blacks who joined the Party, particularly in the Transvaal,
were workers from small semirural locations.87 Thibedi, the son of a
Wesleyan minister, taught in a Wesleyan school in Johannesburg. He was,
Roux later wrote, ‘‘a genius at getting people together, whether workers in
a particular industry, women, location residents, or whatever was needed
at the moment’’.88 In 1925, the CPSA started a night school under his
direction. This attracted forty students in its first year. Initially, classes
were held by candlelight at an African church in Ferreirastown. The
programme was heavy going, covering Bukharin’s and Preobachansky’s
ABC of Communism and Bukharin’s Programme of the World Revolution.
The school became extremely successful at training African cadres; a
number of African recruits who became influential activists gained an
education in the night school.89
The CPSA also began using its paper more strategically, despite the fact
84. Fourth National Conference of the Communist Party of South Africa held at 145 Long
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that its printing press was suffering severe financial difficulties.90 In 1926,
the name of the Party’s paper was changed from the International to the
South African Worker, its masthead now bearing the figures of a shirtless
black miner and a skilled white worker. The paper gave more attention to
issues affecting black workers and began running educational articles. The
27 August issue announced that ‘‘A Communist Primer for South Africa’’,
was to be serialized in the paper to replace the Eurocentric ABC of
Communism.91 In February 1926, the Central Executive Committee had
discussed the possibility of publishing African-language articles, and
decided that Thibedi ‘‘should submit an article as an experiment’’; by 1928
about two to three pages per issue were written in African languages.92
Party activists also turned their attention to the all-black ICU. In 1923
this began to spread ‘‘like a veld fire’’ across the country, setting up
branches in the coastal towns of Port Elizabeth and East London, then in
the rural areas, where it organized blacks living on white farms who were
at risk of losing their access to land. Because of its success, the ICU began
attracting the attention of a number of black leaders and activists who had
previously remained aloof.93 The ICU showed the possibility of a radical
mass mobilization – an achievement which necessitated a response from
the CPSA.94 By 1926, five black communists were on the ICU’s National
Council, and Thibedi was an ICU shop steward and organizer. By the end
of the year, though, the communists’ honeymoon with the ICU was over:
the ICU stipulated that communists could not remain on the executive.95
While this certainly hurt the CPSA’s ability to build a mass base, the Party
nonetheless retained some support at local ICU branch level. Through the
black activists that had joined the CPSA in the mid- and late 1920s, and
that rose through its ranks, the Party was able to maintain its demographic
representation.
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The difficulties faced by the Communist Party in Algeria in recruiting
Algerian members are in stark contrast with the South African experience.
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In South Africa, white labour had revived sufficiently, following the Rand
Revolt, to ensure the electoral victory of the Pact government, even though
this was at the cost of coopting the white labour movement into the state
apparatus, and the ICU was sweeping the country. By contrast, the year
1925 was a low for the working-class movement in Algeria, after the peak
represented by the 1919–1920 strike wave, and a high point for capital,
particularly agrarian capital, due to the increase in the price of wheat. But
Bolshevization in Algeria became intertwined with two political issues
that were absent from the South African landscape at the same time. First
was the Rif war, which sharply intensified repression against Communists
in Algeria. Second was the issue of national liberation and the call for
independence.
Bolshevization was introduced to the French Communist Party in
September 1924. The policy undoubtedly had its critics, but it also had
significant proponents, first and foremost the Young Communists who
climbed the Party hierarchy as a result of their support. There were also
supporters amongst the few Party members who were concerned with
colonial questions. As was the case in South Africa, some North African
communists saw the organizational changes mandated by Bolshevization
as a means to reorient the local SFIC towards Algerians. The old, allegedly
social-democratic, methods were equated with colonialist attitudes. In
June 1924, for instance, Ali Abdelaziz Menouer, an Algerian member of
the SFIC’s Comite´ d’e´tudes coloniales, wrote to a Comrade Kolaroff in
Moscow complaining of the SFIC’s lack of interest in the colonial
question – ‘‘Jusqu’au commencement 1924, le parti n’avait rien fait pour
organiser les travailleurs coloniaux’’96 – of its foot-dragging on the
education of comrades from colonized areas, and of the commission’s lack
of representation at the Fifth Congress. He also complained about the
centre’s decision to send Comrade Ferrand of Sidi-bel-Abbes as the
Algerian delegate. Comrade Ferrand was active and intelligent, wrote Ali
Menouer, but it was feared that he would present only his point of view,
based on a European understanding, and reflective of the line followed by
Europeans in Algeria, which was not always very communist. However,
Menouer added, those supporting greater emphasis on the colonial
question would be very pleased if the Comintern’s directives and the
proposed methods of action presented at its Fifth Congress were
implemented.97
The French Communist Party began paying greater attention to its
Algerian region following its adoption of the Bolshevization policy. In
96. Aziz [Ali Menouer], Rapport sur le travail parmi les coloniaux en France, 6 pp., handwritten,
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September 1924 the Comite´ d’e´tudes coloniales was reorganized as the
Commission coloniale centrale.98 Jacques Doriot, a Paris-based commu-
nist who specialized in anticolonial agitation, and found ready favour in
Moscow due to his loyal support of Comintern policies, gave some
indication of Paris’s approach. Heretofore, the SFIC had been remiss in its
anticolonial work, he indicated in December 1924, and this made the
present efforts more difficult. Nonetheless, the Party had begun to explain
the new policy to its Algerian region. However, the state of mind that had
characterized the local communists had not entirely disappeared, he noted,
and diligent work would be necessary to create federations able to
manoeuvre in the complicated environments of Algeria and Tunisia.99
In order to facilitate centralization, a decision was made at the SFIC’s
fourth national congress in Clichy in January 1925 to fuse the three
Algerian federations.100 The fusion was formalized at a congress in Algiers
on 22 March 1925, accompanied by expulsions.101 It also saw the rise of a
new personality, Pierre Biboulet, Secretary of the Algiers region, who
played a large role in the fusion and in the early implementation of
Bolshevization; it was not a task, evidently, that made him popular
amongst his comrades.102 Along with the move toward centralization went
the adoption of a more emphatic approach to indigenization. The Algiers
congress agreed to the new orientation, acknowledging that the indigenous
masses had to be wakened both to their national consciousness and to the
class struggle, and that this ‘‘must be the principal task of the Communist
Party in Algeria’’ – a striking parallel with the CPSA’s Third Congress of
December 1924.103
Although communists in Algeria had discussed the possibility of
running both European and Algerian candidates in the municipal elections
of May 1925, Bolshevization gave new impetus to this. The campaign
generated mass enthusiasm amongst the Algerian population – but also
unleashed a wave of government repression. The SFIC had already
received extremely positive feedback, both from Algerians in France and in
Algeria, following its decision to run Hadj Ali Abdelkader, a Paris-based
Algerian and a naturalized French citizen, as a candidate in local Paris
elections.104 In Algeria, the local SFIC put forward a European list and an
98. Pierre Durand, Cette myste´rieuse section coloniale: le PCF et les colonies (1920–1962) (Paris,
1986), p. 48.
99. G. Doriot to ‘‘Cher camarades’’, 18 December 1924, PCF file 70.
100. P. Biboulet, Rapport sur la situation politique en Alge´rie, 17 October 1925, 10 pp., typed,
PCF file 120, p. 4.
101. ‘‘Congres de fusion’’, Lutte Sociale, 13 February 1925.
102. ‘‘Pierre Biboulet’’, in Dictionnaire Biographique du mouvement ouvrier franc¸ais, part 4,
1914–1939, vol. 19 (Paris, 1983), p. 151.
103. Biboulet, Rapport sur la situation politique, p. 4.
104. Aziz to Camarade Kolaroff, p. 2; ‘‘40.000 ouvriers parisiens ont vote´ pour le Communiste
Hadjali Abdelkader’’, La Caserne, May–June 1924, pp. 6–7, RGASPI, 517.1.185.
195Bolshevizing Communist Parties
Algerian list under its ‘‘workers and peasants bloc’’. The Algerian list was
headed, symbolically, by Emir Khaled and by Mahmoud ben Lekhal, an
exiled Algerian communist who had been very active in the SFIC’s
campaign against the occupation of the Ruhr; it was a move that was highly
successful for the Party in terms of arousing local Algerian interest.105
The electoral activity attracted new members. The majority of new
recruits were Algerians, attracted by the new orientation, which gave
greater attention to Point 8 of the Comintern’s Twenty-one Points. The
new orientation was reflected in Lutte Sociale, which, since the fusion
conference, was trying to attract a francophone Algerian readership, with
greater coverage of Algerian issues and slightly larger and more readable
headlines. Some of the new members were Europeans, attracted by the
electoral campaign. But, in the aftermath of the elections, many new
members left. The sudden exodus precipitated a feeling of crisis amongst
local communists. Against this backdrop, the Party was ill-prepared for an
onslaught of repression from the state.
The implementation of Bolshevization in Algeria coincided with, and
was justified by, the SFIC’s agitation against the Rif war in Morocco. This
gave Bolshevization in Algeria a particular twist that contrasted markedly
with the South African experience. The immediate causes of the Rif war
dated to 1919, when Spain decided to conquer and subdue the Rif people.
Its attempt failed; in July 1921 Abd el-Krim defeated the Spanish army in
Morocco, and in late January 1923 declared the Republic of Rif. In mid-
1924, following a coup in September 1923, the Spanish withdrew from the
Rif. In May 1924, 12,000 French troops were sent to the Rif; these were
attacked by Abd el-Krim the next month. But two years later, in May
1926, faced with a coalition of French and Spanish forces, Abd el-Krim
surrendered and was exiled to Reunion.106
The Rif war gave the French Communist Party an opportunity to put
Point 8 of the Twenty-one Points into practice, and it conducted a
vigorous campaign against militarism and against the French army in
Morocco – in sharp contrast to the Socialist Party’s ambiguous stance.107
This antiwar campaign attracted and was sustained by the efforts of Young
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Communists, both in France and in Algeria. Many of the leading Young
Communists in mid-1920s Algeria were Europeans, but a number of
Algerians joined around this time. Benali Boukort, for example, who
became Secretary-General of the Algerian Communist Party in 1939,
joined the Young Communists in 1924.108 The repression to which
communists in Algeria were subjected, as a result of their direct
confrontation with state policy, provided the rationale for a more
centralized political approach offered by Bolshevization. As Ageron
noted: ‘‘Le bolche´visation du parti s’accomplit en Alge´rie comme en
France a` la faveur de la guerre du Rif.’’109
From the mid-1920s, the SFIC in Algeria was hit by a wave of repression
that appears to have been far greater – when measured, for example, by
numbers and duration of prison sentences – than that faced by the CPSA
in the same period. The CPSA had faced state repression during and
immediately following the 1922 Rand Revolt, but this had subsequently
eased. South African communists had relative freedom of movement in the
1920s; prison sentences were generally for two to three months, and skilful
lawyers could often help their clients avoid prison altogether.110 By
contrast, in 1924, the SFIC’s stance on the Rif war in Morocco brought it
into direct confrontation with the French state – and the consequences
were very heavy indeed for communists in Algeria. A portent of things to
come was the arrest of Pierre Biboulet in June 1925, a month in which the
Party had directed its energies to a public campaign against the war. The
following month, July 1925, the SFIC sent three representatives from Paris
– Henri Lozeray, Victor-Noe¨l Arrighi, and Jean-Baptiste Aucouterier – to
the Algerian region to campaign against the Rif war. They were arrested on
arrival in Algiers and sentenced in September to two years in Barberousse
Prison.111 Arrests of other local communists soon followed. In August
eleven comrades were detained at Barberousse prison, where others were
already incarcerated. A number of these were prominent in the local
Young Communist League.
That same month Paul Henriet was sent to pick up the thread. Keen to
impress Paris headquarters, Henriet reported that he had guided local
communists in Blida – mainly European artisans – in their propaganda
work in order to ensure Algerian attendance at an upcoming congress. As
was the case with South Africa, the sheer physical difficulty of com-
munication in a country as large as Algeria, with its relatively undeveloped
infrastructure, made centralization an ambitious – if not impossible – goal.
108. Benali Boukort, Le souffle du Dahra (Algiers, 1986), p. 30.
109. Ageron, Histoire de l’Alge´rie Contemporaine, p. 380.
110. Roux, S.P. Bunting. Sidney Bunting was often successful in the 1920s in getting charges
against communists dropped.
111. ‘‘Henri Rudolphe Lozeray’’, in Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement ouvrier franc¸ais,
part 4, 1914–1939, vol. 35 (Paris, 1989), p. 92.
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Based mainly in Algiers, Henriet informed Paris that he planned to spend a
week in Oran: ‘‘I am going to study the situation there, as here people
know practically nothing about Oran. As far as Constantine is concerned,
our letters have gone unanswered for two months.’’112
The country’s great size and its limited infrastructure were certainly
impediments to communication, making national distribution of the
Party’s paper, Lutte Sociale, all the more important. But the paper was
particularly hard hit by the repression, subjected to frequent seizures that
had negative repercussions, both financially and for the Party’s ability
to disseminate its views. The paper was badly in debt, and Pe`re Targe,
the printer, was extremely angry. Targe felt that the paper’s antiwar
propaganda made it a continual target of the regime’s wrath, and argued
that the paper should focus on legitimate electoral activity instead. It was
vital, Henriet advised Paris, that the centre subsidize Lutte Sociale. The
paper was ‘‘the only means to reach the natives in the interior and
elsewhere’’, he argued, ‘‘because the repression already unleashed and the
repression to fear has made many comrades go into their shell’’.113
Repressive laws intimidated people both from renting meeting space to
communists and from attending their meetings. Attendance dropped. ‘‘The
last meetings had proved that natives and Europeans would not attend’’,
Henriet observed, necessitating private meetings. They had to be careful to
ensure that their most recent friends were not subjected to repression. His
words – ‘‘Nous ne sommes plus en France’’ – merely underscored the
contradictory nature of the Algerian situation.114
Over the next several years, a series of leading activists were imprisoned,
often for periods of two years, due to antiwar activities. This made it
virtually impossible to organize and coordinate activities and devastated
morale. But Bolshevization in Algeria not only differed from the South
African experience in terms of the level of repression. If Bolshevization in
South Africa became intertwined with the Party’s reorientation towards
black labour – a reorientation that nonetheless clearly accepted the
primacy of class struggle and the state’s territorial boundaries – in Algeria
it became intertwined with debates about national liberation and in-
dependence. The idea of a national liberation movement that raised the
possibility of independence from France was clearly much more difficult
for communists in the SFIC than the notion of black and white working-
class unity was for South African communists. Tensions around this issue
were apparent in late 1925, and mounted to a destructive level over the next
few years.
112. Rapport de Henriet, Algiers, 1 September 1925, 3 pp. typed, p. 3, PCF file 120; translated
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The Comintern’s call to build a national liberation movement in Algeria
met with strong resistance from local communists. Many argued that the
call for national liberation was premature; instead they emphasized the
struggle for equality and for working-class unity within the existing
colonial framework. Ironically, Henriet came to share this view. He had
been particularly impressed by Henri Schiavo, a trade-unionist from Blida
who did not think it was possible to build a national movement. Schiavo
would be an ideal leader for the local communists, Henriet wrote Paris.
He had created a magnificent union of Europeans and Algerians and
spoke some Arabic. He was, Henriet thought, ‘‘l’homme du moment’’.
What Algerians wanted, Henriet informed Paris, was equal rights with
Europeans. They understood that conditions imposed a class struggle
rather than a struggle for independence, which would lead nowhere.115
But Pierre Biboulet was one who believed that the French Communist
Party should promote a national struggle for independence. Biboulet was
severely critical of the local Party’s delay in recruiting Algerians. Even up
to the legislative elections of May 1924, he claimed, the Party had failed to
take a position on ‘‘la question indige`ne’’ for fear of alienating the ‘‘petits
colons’’. This delay he attributed both to a social-democratic outlook,
closer in spirit to the Second rather than the Third International, and to
racial prejudice, which, he stressed, existed even among communists.116 In
Biboulet’s view, the repression against the Party was as much a response to
the Communist Party’s joint European-Algerian electoral campaign as to
the Party’s antiwar campaign; the possibility of fraternity between
Europeans and Algerians was a greater threat to the state than the Party’s
antiwar campaign. Biboulet believed that the Algerian majority nurtured
the hope of independence. He wrote to Paris,
How can one doubt it [:::] when we see the passionate interest with which the
Algerian natives follow the events of Rif and of Syria? In the most remote
douarts, in cities and in the countryside, amongst Arabs and amongst Kabyles,
amongst the uneducated as well as the intellectuals, everyone is avid for news.117
At a meeting in Blida, Biboulet wrote, an Algerian interrupted to call for ‘‘a
state that is independent of all European tutelage’’.118
Tensions over this issue increased the following year. In February 1926,
the Algerian federation held its annual conference. A report in Lutte
Sociale underlined the need for alliances between the working class and
national movements. It urged European communists to surmount their
attitude of racial superiority vis-a-vis Algerians, an attitude that was
115. Ibid.
116. Biboulet, Rapport sur la situation politique, p. 3.
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deliberately fostered, it argued, by the imperialist bourgeoisie in order to
facilitate its colonial policies. Organizing for national liberation was one
step in the struggle against French imperialism, and even if this effort led
only to a national revolution, this outcome would help to expose class
antagonisms.119 Yet this view was not uniformly held, and political
differences did not necessarily correspond to nationality. Amar, a comrade
from Algiers, argued that the demand for ‘‘Inde´pendance de l’Alge´rie’’ did
not correspond to the actual situation. Instead, the Party should develop a
policy appropriate to the actual conditions rather than launching slogans
that would not be understood either by the Algerian or the European
masses. In his view, the Party should organize Algerians as workers in
trade unions, develop their class-consciousness and fight against the
indige´nat. Nonetheless, the conference decided by a vote of twenty-eight
for and six against, with five abstentions, to promote the slogan of
independence.120
This position was reinforced at the French Communist Party’s fifth
national congress in Lille in June 1926, which underlined the need
to address the colonial question and to contest the influence of the Social-
ist Party, whose position on colonialism was seen as counter-
revolutionary.121 Nonetheless, discord about the call for independence
continued throughout 1926 and beyond. Like the Communist Party, the
Young Communist League, which had been heavily hit by repression,
was divided over the issue.122 Its political secretary, Ayache, argued that
since the YCL was not known throughout Algeria, it should first
penetrate the masses through regular activity, calling for fraternization
between European and Algerian soldiers without adding the premature
demand for independence, which would only exacerbate the repression
against Young Communists. Lutte Sociale had already been seized for
much less radical slogans, he pointed out.123 Animosities over this issue
escalated over the next several years. The disagreements became
increasingly hostile and personalized, and were accompanied by expul-
sions; communists in Algeria sought the assistance of Party headquarters
in Paris against each other. But these disagreements took place when the
Communist Party in Algeria was already devastated by repression and
virtually inactive in some areas. They compounded the tiny Party’s
problems further.
119. ‘‘En vue de la Confe´rence: ce que doit-eˆtre notre politique Coloniale en Alge´rie’’, Lutte
Sociale, 19 February 1926.
120. ‘‘Le rayon d’Alger adopte a` une forte majorite´ les the`ses presente´es par le Comite´ central’’,
Lutte Sociale, 26 February 1926.
121. Sous-Commission Nord Africaine, Se´ance du 28 Juillet 1926, RGASPI 517.1.409, p. 1.
122. Letter to Camarades, Setif, 4 October [1926], RGASPI 517.1.456.
123. Ayache to Camarades du CC, 20 October 1926, RGASPI 517.1.456.
200 Allison Drew
C O N C L U S I O N
Despite the French Communist Party’s growing recognition of the need to
work amongst and recruit Algerians, there was great variation in the way
that communists in Algeria interpreted this agenda. Yet, there were
individuals with a will to actively recruit Algerians. How then do we
explain the differential success rates in Algeria and South Africa with
regards to indigenization? In broad strokes, Algeria and South Africa show
striking parallels in their political economies. Yet, they also show striking
contrasts in their patterns of proletarianization and urbanization, notably,
Algeria’s displaced proletariat and South Africa’s migrant labour force.
Classical Marxist theory, on which these early communists largely based
their analyses, assumes the primacy of the urban working class in social
change. Whatever the difficulties faced by South African communists in
this regard, the conditions facing communists in Algeria were more
difficult. Their country was less urbanized than South Africa at compar-
able points in time, and a critical section of the Algerian working class was
in France. The contrasting patterns of proletarianization and urbanization
in these two cases posed constraints both on the immediate prospects for
organizational development in the respective working classes and, in turn,
on the perceptions and attitudes of local communists.
South Africa’s lack of a well-rooted pre-existing socialist or social-
democratic tradition may well have made the tasks of early communists
very difficult, and also made them more vulnerable to the Comintern’s
influence. Nonetheless, the two revolutionary traditions inherited by
communists in Algeria – that of France and that of the Bolsheviks – were a
heavy burden. The two traditions loomed large in the pages of Lutte
Sociale, which were weighed down by their influence, leaving little space
for Algerian issues. In terms of local content and of creative editorial
experimentation to attract the urban indigenous working class, Lutte
Sociale lagged behind South African Worker in those years. The existence
of a social-democratic alternative in the form of the Socialist Party also
presented difficulties for communist organizers in Algeria. Despite its
minute size, the Socialist Party presented a credible left-wing alternative
for European workers in Algeria that could also lay claim to the French
revolutionary tradition.
The Comintern’s relationships with communists in Algeria and South
Africa also differed markedly, posing serious challenges for the unidimen-
sional centre–periphery framework that has dominated communist stud-
ies. The Comintern prioritized those countries and regions that it believed
to be of international geopolitical significance. This necessarily included
the French Communist Party, whose relationship with the Comintern was
frequently tense. The Comintern intervened in Algeria far earlier than it
did in South Africa, and the impact of its policies was felt far earlier.
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Although views similar to those expressed in the Sidi-bel-Abbes thesis
could be found amongst early white South African communists, the
Comintern made an example of the former in no small part to criticize the
French Communist Party. Moreover, the Comintern’s increasing empha-
sis on assisting national liberation struggles was felt first in Algeria,
coinciding with the first few years of Bolshevization and with an
intensification of state repression against Communists. The CPSA, by
contrast, confronted the issue of national liberation in 1928, after the Party
had made significant progress with indigenization; even then, national
liberation was conceived in terms of full equality and never in terms of
transformation of the state’s territorial boundaries.124
Communist activity in Algeria in the mid-1920s took place during a
repressive climate; in turn, it undoubtedly led to an intensification of
repression. By all indications, the onslaught of repression against com-
munists in Algeria was greater than in South Africa – reflecting both
French colonial control and the geopolitics of the Rif war – and impeded
the growth of a tiny party. Certainly, the different degrees of repression
experienced by communist activists in Algeria and South Africa goes some
way in explaining the contrasts in the abilities of the two parties to
indigenize. In sum, each of the four variables was experienced differently
by communists in the two countries. The cumulative weight of the
variables in the Algerian case helps to explain why, in the 1920s,
communist activity – including the Communist Party’s ability to
indigenize – was far more difficult in Algeria than South Africa.
An evaluation of communist experiences by reference to a multivariable
and comparative approach highlights the limitations of the centre–
periphery model that characterized communist studies for many decades,
especially during the twentieth century’s long Cold War. In this case, the
intensity of the problems faced by communists in Algeria can only be
understood by comparison with other communist experiences. Moreover,
the relative difficulties that the Communist Party in Algeria faced in
recruiting Algerian members may, in turn, provide insight into its
ambiguous relationship with the national liberation movement over the
ensuing decades – again in notable contrast to the South African
experience. This suggests that the history of international communism
can be understood as sequences of policies that, because they are applied in
different national contexts with cumulative effects, produce increasingly
divergent outcomes in those countries.
124. For the CPSA’s reactions to the Comintern’s pressure to deal with national liberation, see
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